Abstract. Many innovations in the automotive industry are based on electronics and software, which has led to a steady increase of electronic control units (ECU) in cars. This brought up serious scalability and complexity issues in terms of cost, installation space, and energy consumption. In order to tackle these problems, there is a strong interest to consolidate ECUs using virtualization technologies. However, current efforts largely neglect legal constraints and certification issues and the resulting technical requirements. In this paper, we focus on the consolidation of graphics hardware through virtualization, which received a lot of interest in the car industry due to the growing relevance of HMI systems such as head unit and instrument cluster in modern cars. First, we investigate relevant ISO standards and legal requirements and derive seven technical requirements for a virtualized automotive HMI system. Based on these requirements, we present the concept for a Virtualized Automotive Graphics System (VAGS ) that allows for the consolidation of mixed-criticality graphics ECUs.
Introduction
Over the years, the automotive industry, which was mainly driven by hardware and mechanics in the past, has changed to an industry where about 90 % of all innovations are driven by electronics and software [3] . In current high-end cars, the IT hardware and software architecture is represented by more than 70 physically separated electronic control units (ECU), which are partitioned into different domains and connected via a network of different communication bus systems. To deploy new functionalities, the OEMs often add further ECUs to the vehicle. This trend of "new function, new ECU" has lead to serious scalability issues in terms of cost, installation space, and energy consumption. In order to deal with these problems and to stop this trend of adding further ECUs, there is a strong interest in the car industry to consolidate ECUs using virtualization technologies to share the same hardware between different components.
In this paper, we focus on the consolidation of graphics hardware since it is of high relevance in modern cars. An increasing number of automotive functionalities and applications require highly sophisticated graphical representations in 2D or 3D based on hardware acceleration. For instance, the Head Unit (HU) uses displays integrated into the backside of the front seats and center console to display multimedia content; and displays connected to the Instrument Cluster (IC) show car specific information like current vehicle speed or warnings. Therefore, HU and IC are good candidates for hardware consolidation. Each virtualized ECU runs in a dedicated virtual machine (VM), and a virtual machine monitor (VMM) acts as middleware between VMs and hardware. Besides the already mentioned general benefits, the virtualization of IC and HU provides advantages such as the flexible placement of graphical output on previously separated displays, which is a matter of software implementation only. Moreover, virtualization enables OEMs to deploy custom applications inside a dedicated VM that is isolated from HU and IC.
This paper makes the following two contributions to enable the consolidation of graphics hardware in vehicular systems. First, we thoroughly analyze relevant ISO standards and legal requirements and derive seven technical requirements for a virtualized automotive HMI system. Such requirements have been largely neglected by current virtualization efforts, which did not target automotive systems with their specific requirements, in particular, with respect to safety. For OEMs, the certifiability of automotive system functionalities is highly relevant. According to [16, ISO 26262] , for each functionality safety-criticality shall be identified and mapped to criticality-classes 3 . To fulfill the criticality-level, the severity and likelihood of failures must be determined using, for instance, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [25] . Moreover, certifiability also applies to custom third-party applications. For instance, [12, ISO 15005 ] prohibits displaying movies to the driver while the vehicle is in motion. These specific regulations impose challenging technical requirements to virtualization.
As second contribution, we present a concept for a Virtualized Automotive Graphics System (VAGS ). We elaborate on the challenges that are due to the identified requirements to consolidate mixed-criticality graphics ECUs as used, in particular, by the HU and IC. Although virtualization is a mature technology for general resources like CPU or main memory, existing concepts do neither provide sufficient isolation for accessing shared graphics hardware (GPU) and input devices (e.g., steering wheel buttons), nor do they provide sufficient isolation for implementing the flexible presentation of application windows. Our proposed architecture can be used as starting point for the future implementation of the specified components.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we analyze automotive standards and guidelines and derive technical requirements. In Section 3, we present the concept for a VAGS. In Section 4, we briefly describe a first proof-of-concept implementation of our concepts. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5 and conclude this paper with a summary and outlook onto future work in Section 6.
Requirements
In this section, we discuss requirements that are relevant for automotive HMI systems. Automotive application development is constrained by ISO standards, automotive design guidelines, legal requirements, and OEM specific demands. The design guidelines (e.g., [1, AAM 2006] , [5, ESoP 2008] , [18, JAMA 2004] ) in the automotive domain are almost completely derived from the following ISO standards.
- [11, ISO 11428 . This requires authentication and may also involve cryptographic key management (9.1.1) and key access (9.1.7.1).
R4 -Virtualized Graphics Rendering
In our system, multiple VMs have shared access to a single GPU, and therefore the VMM has to provide isolation. That is, unintended interference between applications must not occur.
R4.1 -Priority Handling:
Application windows must be assigned a priority which determines how GPU commands are processed [12 R6 -Certifiability For an OEM, certifiability is an essential part of the software development process, e.g., by using methods like FMEA [25] . The development process for certified software, in particular, for high criticality levels, is quite complex and expensive. A key indicator for complexity is the number of function points that correlates with the approximated number of software defects [3] . Hence, a system shall be developed with respect to an easy certification according to [16, ISO 26262 ].
R7 -System Monitoring System Monitoring puts the focus on logging, detecting, and reacting to events that possibly are relevant to provide safety.
R7.1 -Secure Boot: Derived from [13, ISO 15408-2], the system shall provide secure boot to ensure the integrity of the system. Compromising the system (14.6.9.1) or system devices or elements (14.6.9.2) by physical tampering shall be unambiguously detected.
R7.2 -Auditing:
The auditing of all safety-critical related events shall be guaranteed to ensure traceability of system activities in an automotive HMI system that potentially violate safety or security. Therefore, direct hardware access must not be permitted to ensure that auditing cannot be bypassed.
For a potential violation analysis, a fixed set of rules shall be defined for a basic threshold detection, [13, ISO 15408-2] (7.3.2). To indicate any potential violation of the system-defined rules, the monitoring of audited events shall also be based on a set of rules (7.3.8.1) that must be enforced by the system either as an accumulation or a combination of a subset of defined auditable events which are known to threat the system security (7. 
Architecture
In this section, we briefly describe the architecture of a Virtualized Automotive Graphics System (VAGS ) (cf. Fig. 1 ) that addresses the identified requirements. Certifiability (R6) applies to the complete development process, all other requirements are represented by the functionalities of the components of our architecture. With respect to certifiability, we follow the approach of a microkernelbased VMM where drivers run in user space rather than kernel space. Therefore, the kernel code size is very small and easier to certify [3] . If driver code crashes, this does not affect the VMM. The Virtualization Manager runs in a dedicated VM and exclusively manages shared resources. It contains relevant drivers, e.g., for GPU and input devices. This ensures that access to all shared resources is controlled by a single trustworthy VM. Indirect hardware access by VMs facilitates Virtualized Graphics Rendering (R4) and System Monitoring (R7). Additionally, the Virtualization Manager contains multiple software components ensuring that every hardware access by VMs is in compliance with our requirements. Note that our architecture only shows four exemplarily VMs. However, we do not restrict the number of VMs. Therefore, it is possible to deploy additional VMs if needed. In order to access hardware, the HU and IC VMs communicate with the Virtualization Manager VM. For this bidirectional communication, a Trusted Channel (R3) is required to support secure communication between the different virtual machines. A trusted channel is provided by the cooperation of the Isolated Communication Channel and the Authentication Manager. The Isolated Communication Channel provides integrity and isolation for communication (R3.1) between applications and the Virtualization Manager. To initiate a connection, applications first have to provide valid credentials to the Authentication Manager, to guarantee non-repudiation of origin and receipt (R3.2). In particular, this is required for the communication between the graphical applications located on HU or IC and the virtualization manager, which needs to be trustworthy to ensure that the active policy is never violated.
Permission and Policy Management (R5) ensures that applications are getting their defined permissions to use functionalities or resources provided by the Input Manager, Window Manager, or GPU Scheduler. Permissions are represented by the active policy, which depends on the current state (R5.1), e.g., "vehicle is parking" or "vehicle is in motion". The policy management is configured by rules that define transitions between policies performed whenever state changes (R5.2) in defined time constraints (R5.3). The Input Manager performs Input Event Handling (R1) and is responsible for dispatching user input events to the intended applications (R1.1). Since the processing of user input is subject to time restrictions, a minimal delivery time for input events to the applications must be ensured (R1.2).
The GPU Scheduler is responsible for Virtualized Graphics Rendering (R4) according to drawing requirements and permissions of graphical applications. To this end, applications are assigned priorities that define the amount of dedicated GPU resources (R4.1). Besides priorities, according to (R4.2), deadlines apply to the graphical rendering of certain applications like the tachometer. The GPU scheduler, therefore, has to sequence graphics commands, schedule application requests and provide isolation between different contexts (R4.3).
The Window Manager provides the functionality for creating, positioning, and displaying windows of graphical applications. This represents a paradigm shift from fully user-defined window management to restricted window creation and positioning (R2). Applications with sufficient permissions interact with the Window Manager to create windows and to modify properties like size and position (R2.1). Moreover the Window Manager is responsible for correct window stacking (R2.2) and meeting rendering time requirements (R2.3).
In order to guarantee Secure Boot (R7.1), the integrity of code that is loaded must be verified, using, for instance, approaches described in [8] . The Auditing component (R7.2) traces all relevant system activities and interactions. The gathered traces can be used by the Watchdog and System Monitor components to detect inconsistencies (for R7.3 to R7.7). The Watchdog supervises relevant system functionalities and emits signals in case of system malfunctioning as required for R7.3 to R7.6. The System Monitor receives signals of detected system malfunctions from the Watchdog. Rules are used to configure its reaction on these signals.
Implementation
We have created a proof-of-concept implementation for the main parts of our proposed VAGS architecture. The implementation consists of a Window Manager using an hierarchical access control management for display areas and input events. It supports permission negotiation between different virtual machines and applications. The applications create, destroy and move their windows using a dedicated Window Manager API. Based on their permissions, applications are allowed to display their windows in dedicated display areas. Furthermore, each display area is mapped to a depth level representing the priority of the application. This prevents that application windows are overlapped by windows of applications with lower priority. The Window Manager has a dedicated compositing backend which is currently (as an intermediate step) based on X11 compositing.
Linux was used as operating system for the Virtualization Manager and the graphical applications. As a first step we used an x86 standard PC platform and created a set of automotive applications like speedometer and navigation software to demonstrate the feasibility of the concept.
For communication between applications located on different VMs, a transport layer has been implemented. The channels use a custom ring buffer implementation and shared memory to establish data transfer channels. These channels are used for forwarding graphics data like EGL, OpenGL ES 2.0, and API commands of the Window Manager, from the graphics applications to the Virtualization Manager. The management of shared memory is performed by a dedicated component in the Virtualization Manager. To allow applications on different VMs for initiating new connections, in each VM a management process performs the mapping of shared memory segments to applications. The Virtualization Manager performs simple scheduling using synchronization mechanisms of OpenGL ES 2.0.
Related Work
The concept of microkernel-based VMMs in virtualization is well known for many years. The focus on safety increased during the last few years, e.g., the NOVA microkernel [26] . Moreover, certifiability became more important, at least in case of the VMM [22] .
A large number of work related to virtualization and graphics applications has been described in the literature. Due to space constraints, we only focus on windowing systems, GPU scheduling, and graphics forwarding in the following. According to [17] , the X11 Windowing System does not provide security. Trusted X [4] has been proposed to provide security for the X Windowing System targeting the requirements in TCSEC B3 (superseded by [13, ISO 15408-2]) but has not been certified. To provide isolation, an untrusted X server and a window manager is deployed for each security level which impacts scalability. Therefore, mutual isolation of applications is practically impossible due to scalability issues. Nitpicker [7] is a GUI server with security mechanisms and protocols to provide secure and isolated user interaction using different operating systems. To achieve isolation between these OSes, Nitpicker uses the VMM L4/Fiasco [10] . The EROS Window System (EWS) [24] targets the protection of sensitive information and the enforcement of security policies by providing access control mechanisms and enforcing the user volition. A common denominator of Trusted X, Nitpicker, and EWS is that they only focus on security and thus do not comply with Input Event Handling (R1), Restricted Window Creation and Positioning (R2), and System Monitoring (R5). DOpE [6] is a window server that assures redrawing rates windows of real-time applications and provides a best-effort service for non-real-time applications. DOpE is based on L4/Fiasco [10] for isolation and IPC. However, policies are not enforced. Common to all these windowing systems is the fact that they do not support graphics hardware acceleration and do not provide any timing guarantees for rendering and displaying.
GERM [2] provides GPU resource management targeting fairness without addressing isolation or prioritization. Timegraph [21] enhances these concepts and provides priority-based scheduling of GPU command groups for DRI2. However, for the execution time of an GPU command group no upper bound can be guaranteed and the performance is heavily degraded. Additionally, due to latency induced by synchronous GPU operations, applications using the X Server and double buffering encounter additional problems addressed in [20] . However, the X Server itself does not provide sufficient isolation mechanisms and therefore cannot be used for an automotive HMI system. VMGL [23] is an approach to transfer OpenGL commands from an OpenGL client to an OpenGL server using a TCP/IP connection. However, using TCP/IP causes significant latency and overhead. Blink [9] is a display system which focuses on the safe multiplexing of OpenGL programs in different VMs. Blink uses an OpenGL Client/Server to transmit the OpenGL commands and data via shared memory to a "Driver VM". The "Driver VM" is responsible for the execution of the OpenGL commands on the GPU. Blink proposes "BlinkGL" which increases performance, but requires applications to be modified.
Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we presented requirements for novel automotive HMI systems. From relevant ISO standards, we derived seven technical requirements for the physical consolidation of mixed-criticality graphical ECUs such as head unit and instrument cluster. Additionally we presented VAGS (Virtualized Automotive Graphics System), a novel automotive HMI concept which provides isolation between custom graphics applications running in dedicated VMs. Although these applications are not certified, a VAGS can guarantee that no unintended interference with certified OEM software can take place. We presented a suitable architecture and created a proof-of-concept implementation. In future work we are going to improve graphics scheduling by using execution time prediction of graphics commands and by using a more suitable scheduling algorithm. Furthermore, we implement system monitoring, auditing, a watchdog, and integrate authentication concepts. Since the current implementation is based on X11, which has a couple of drawbacks, we plan to switch to a native implementation tailored to embedded hardware. Finally, we evaluate and optimize the performance of our implementation depending on different application scenarios.
